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The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects
in the extreme dictator game
Valerio Capraro∗ Andrea Vanzo†
Abstract
Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major topic of debate in the last decades. For
example, several works have explored whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of pro-sociality
than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results. Here we contribute to this debate with two experiments. In
Study 1 (N = 567) we implement an extreme dictator game in which the dictator either gets $0.50 and the recipient gets nothing,
or the opposite (i.e., the recipient gets $0.50 and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words describing
the available actions using six terms, from very negative (e.g., stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. We find
that the rate of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available actions. In Study 2 (N = 221) we ask brand
new participants to rate each of the words used in Study 1 from “extremely wrong” to “extremely right” . We find that these
moral judgments explain the framing effect in Study 1. In sum, our studies provide evidence that framing effects in an extreme
Dictator game can be generated using morally loaded language.
Keywords: framing effect, moral preferences, dictator game, moral judgment
1 Introduction
Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to non-
economic cues, such as the name that the experimenter gives
to the game or the words used to describe the available ac-
tions, has been amajor topic of debate in the last two decades.
Earlier works found that people cooperate more in the
Prisoner’s dilemma when it is called Community Game than
when it is called Wall Street Game (Kay & Ross, 2003;
Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004). Yet, it was soon noticed
that the presence of social framing effects in the Prisoner’s
dilemma does not imply that preferences are sensitive to
context. It might be that social framing works as a coor-
dination devise, by affecting participants’ beliefs about the
behavior of the other people involved in the interaction (Fehr
& Schmidt, 2006). Consistent with this view, Ellingsen
et al. (2012) found that social framing effects in the Pris-
oner’s dilemma vanish when the game is played sequentially,
suggesting that social cues primarily works by changing par-
ticipants’ beliefs.
To shed light on this issue, in more recent years scholars
have started investigating whether social framing can affect
people’s choices not in strategic games, but in social decision
problems. In this context, the decision maker can affect the
outcome of one or more other people, but these people have
noway to affect the decisionmaker’s outcome. Since in these
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situations beliefs play no role, any framing effect would be
uniquely driven by a chance in preferences.
A stream of research has focused on whether the words
used to describe the available actions can affect decisionmak-
ers’ choices. The empirical evidence has shown that indeed
they can, at least in some contexts. Eriksson et al. (2017)
have found that rejection rates in theUltimatumgame depend
on whether the rejection option is called “payoff reduction”
or “costly punishment”. In the former case, responders are
less likely to reject the proposer’s offer, and this effect ap-
pears to be driven bymoral concerns. Similarly, Capraro and
Rand (2018) and Tappin and Capraro (2018) have found that
behavior in the Trade-Off game, i.e. a decision problem in
which decision-makers have to decide between an equitable
and an efficient allocation of resources, highly depends on
which choice is presented as being the “right thing to do”.
Particularly interesting is the situation regarding the Dic-
tator game (DG). The DG, whereby the dictator has to de-
cide how to unilaterally divide a sum of money between
her/himself and the recipient, is considered to be the stan-
dard measure of altruistic behavior and, for this reason, is
among the most studied decision problems in social science
(Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Eckel & Gross-
man, 1996; Engel, 2011; Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro,
& Barcelo, 2016). Studies exploring framing effects in the
DG have led to mixed results. Previous works have mainly
focused on whether the DG in the Take frame gives rise to
higher pro-sociality than the same game in the Give frame.
Swope et al. (2008) have found that participants tend to
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be more pro-social in the DG in the Take frame than in the
DG in the Give frame. In the Take frame, the endowment
was initially given to the recipient, and dictators could take
any amount. Krupka and Weber (2013) have replicated this
framing effect in a context in which the initial endowment
is split equally among the dictator and the recipient. Ad-
ditionally, Krupka and Weber (2013) have shown that this
framing effect is driven by a change in the perception of
what is the “socially appropriate thing to do”. However,
the framing effect when passing from the Take frame to the
Give frame has not been replicated by several other works
(Dreber, Ellingsen, Johannesson, & Rand, 2013; Grossman
& Eckel, 2015; Halvorsen, 2015; Hauge, Brekke, Johans-
son, Johansson-Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016; Goerg, Rand,
&Walkowitz, 2017), casting doubts on the very existence of
framing effects in the DG.1
Here we focus on the existence of framing effects in the
DG with two experiments. In Study 1, we implement an
extreme DG, where the dictator can either allocate $0.50 to
himself and $0 to the recipient, or the other way around, s/he
can allocate $0.50 to the recipient and $0 to himself. We
then manipulate the words used to describe the two available
actions through six different frames. We find that this word
manipulation significantly impacts participants’ decisions.
In Study 2 we ask brand new participants to rate all the
words used to describe the available actions in Study 1, from
“extremely wrong” to “extremely right”. We show that the
rate of pro-sociality in a given frame of Study 1 can be
predicted by the difference between the rating of the word
associated, in the same frame, to the pro-social action and
the rating of the word associated, in the same frame, to the
pro-self action.
2 Study 1
We consider a variant of the standard DG. In the standard
DG, the dictator has to allocate an amount of money (e.g.,
$0.50) between her/himself and another participant (typi-
cally anonymous). The recipient has no choice and only gets
what the dictator decides to give. Conversely, in our ex-
treme version, the dictator can opt only for the two extreme
options: either s/he gets the whole $0.50 (and the recipient
gets nothing) or the other way around, i.e., the recipient gets
the $0.50 and the dictator gets nothing. The reason why we
choose this extreme variant, rather than the standard one, is
1Related to this literature, some studies have shown that extending the
choice set of the standard DG to include a taking option has the effect of de-
creasing giving (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008; Cappelen, Nielsen, Sørensen,
Tungodden, & Tyran, 2013; Zhang & Ortmann, 2013). Eichenberger and
Oberholzer-Gee (1998) have found that the amount given by students who
perform well in a test to students who perform bad in the same test is greater
than the amount not taken by students who perform bad in a test from stu-
dents who perform well. Chang, Chen and Krupka (2017) have found that
the DG in the tax frame gives rise to more pro-sociality than the standard
DG.
to be able to write the instructions of the decision problem in
several different treatments by changing just one word. This
would have been hard, if not impossible, with the classical
“continuous” variant, as it will be clear later. In this extreme
DG, we hypothesize that the words used to describe the
available actions will impact participants’ choices, beyond
the economic consequences that these actions bring about.
The intuition is that, under the same economic conditions,
naming the self-regarding action through an extremely “neg-
ative” expression as Steal from the other participant, rather
than using the more “neutral” expression Take from the other
participant, will significantly impact the final decision.
2.1 Experimental Design
Participants are randomly assigned to one of twelve condi-
tions. In the Steal vs Don’t steal condition, they are told that
there are $0.50 available and they have to choose between
two possible actions: Steal from the other participant, so
that they would get the $0.50 and the other participant would
get nothing; orDon’t steal from the other participant, so that
the other participant would get the $0.50, while they would
get nothing. It is made explicit that the other participant has
no choice and will be really paid according to the decision
made. Participants are also asked two comprehension ques-
tions, to make sure they understand the decision problem.
One question asks which choice would maximize their pay-
off; the other one asks which choice would maximize the
other participant’s payoff. Participants failing either or both
comprehension questions are automatically excluded from
the survey. Those who pass the comprehension questions
are asked to make the real choice. The Don’t steal vs Steal
condition is similar: the only difference is that we switched
the order of presentation of the options, in order to account
for order effects. The conditions Take vs Don’t take, Don’t
take vs Take, Demand vs Don’t demand, Don’t demand vs
Demand, Give vs Don’t give, Don’t give vs Give, Donate vs
Don’t donate, Don’t donate vs Donate, Boost vs Don’t boost,
Don’t boost vs Boost are analogous. Hence, the instructions
of one frame differ from those of another frame only in one
word (see Appendix for full instructions). This justifies our
choice of an extreme variant of the Dictator game, rather than
the classical “continuous” variant. A moment of reflection
shows that it is very hard, if not impossible, to write, for ex-
ample, the Take frame and the Give frame in a “continuous”
form using instructions differing only in one word.2
2The choice of the words “steal”, “take”, “demand”, “donate”, “give”,
and “boost” was motivated by Sentiment Analysis (Pang & Lee, 2004;
Pang, Lee, & Vaithyanathan, 2002; Liu, Cao, Lin, Huang, & Zhou, 2007;
McGlohon, Glance, & Reiter, 2010; Vanzo, Croce, & Basili, 2014). In par-
ticular, we based our choice on a lexical resource known as SentiWordNet
(Baccianella, Esuli, & Sebastiani, 2010; Esuli & Sebastiani, 2006), which
divides the English vocabulary in synsets (i.e., sets of synonyms). We se-
lected six synsets containing words that are particularly suitable to describe
actions in an extreme dictator game: steal#1 = “take without the owner’s
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A standard demographic questionnaire concludes the sur-
vey. At the end of the questionnaire, participants are com-
municated the completion code with which they can submit
the survey to Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and claim
their payment. Payoffs are computed and paid on top of their
participation fee ($0.50). The other participant was selected
at random from the same sample. Therefore, participants re-
ceived a payment both from their choice as decision makers,
and from being in the role of the “other participant” for a
different participant. It is worth noticing that when making
their choice, participants were not informed that they would
also be in the role of the “other participant” to avoid hav-
ing this affect their decision. We refer to the Appendix for
verbatim experimental instructions.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Participants
We recruited US based participants on the online platform
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).3 We collected 727 obser-
vations and cleaned this dataset through the following two
operations. First, we looked for multiple observations by
checking multiple IP addresses and multiple Turk IDs. In
case we found multiple observations, we kept only the first
one as determined by the starting date and we deleted all
the remaining ones. Second, we discarded all participants
who failed either or both comprehension questions. After
these operations, we remained with a sample of N = 567
participants (52.7% females, mean age = 37.6 years). Thus,
in total, 22% of the participants have been eliminated from
the analysis. This is in line with previously published studies
using AMT (Horton et al., 2011).
2.2.2 Pro-Sociality
To analyze this sample, we first build a binary variable,
named Pro-Sociality, which takes value 1whenever a partic-
ipant allocates the $0.50 to the other person, and 0whenever
a participant allocates the $0.50 to him/herself. AveragePro-
Sociality across the whole sample is 0.141, that is, 14.1%
of the participants act pro-socially. Pro-Sociality within a
frame turns out to not depend on the order in which the
options are presented, e.g., average Pro-Sociality in the con-
dition Steal vs Don’t steal is not statistically different from
average Pro-Sociality in the condition Don’t steal vs Steal.
Similarly for all other frames. Thus, in what follows we
consent”; take#8 = “take into one’s possession”; demand#1 = “request ur-
gently and forcefully”; give#3 = “transfer possession of something concrete
or abstract to somebody”; donate#1 = “give to a charity or good cause”;
and boost#2 = “be beneficial to”.
3Several works have shown that data gathered using AMT are of no less
quality than data collected using the standard laboratory (Arechar, Gächter,
& Molleman, 2018; Brañas-Garza, Capraro, & Rascon-Ramirez, 2018;
Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Paolacci,
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Rand, 2012).
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Figure 1: Pro-Sociality across frames in Study 1. Error bars
represent standard errors of the means.
collapse across order and we name w the union between
condition w vs Don’t w and Don’t w vs w.
2.2.3 Framing effect
We now test our hypothesis that the words used to describe
the available actions affect Pro-Sociality. Figure 1 provides
visual evidence that there is significant variability across
conditions: the minimum of the variable Pro-Sociality is
attained in the Boost frame (5.0%), while its maximum is
attained in the Steal frame (29.5%). Table 1 reports coeffi-
cients and standard errors of pairwise logit regressions. In
short, it emerges that the Steal frame produces an amount
of pro-sociality that is statistically significantly higher than
that of any other frames. Conversely, the Boost frame gives
rise to an amount of pro-sociality that is numerically lower
than that of any other frames; however, the difference is sta-
tistically significant only versus theDemand, Take, and Steal
frames, while it is marginally significant versus the Donate
frame. The other frames numerically lie between the Boost
frame and the Steal frame, but pairwise differences are not
statistically significant.
3 Study 2
Study 1 shows that the words used to describe the available
actions in an extreme dictator game can significantly im-
pact participants’ decisions. How can we explain this result?
Since different frames have the same economic structure,
this finding is inconsistent with standard theories of social
preferences, which assume that people’s utility function de-
pends only on the economic consequences of the available
actions (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000;
Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004). One
potential explanation is that participants have moral prefer-
ences: they compare the moral goodness of the pro-social
action to the moral badness of the pro-self action, and then
act pro-socially only when the resulting difference is large
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Table 1: Pairwise logit regression predicting the effect on
Pro-Sociality of passing from one frame of Study 1 to the
other one. We report coefficients and, in brackets, standard
errors. Significance thresholds: *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***:
p < 0.01.
Give Donate Demand Take Steal
Boost -0.607 -0.937* -1.181** -1.234** -2.065***
(0.590) (0.560) (0.548) (0.529) (0.515)
Give -0.331 -0.575 -0.628 -1.458***
(0.490) (0.477) (0.455) (0.438)
Donate -0.244 -0.297 -1.128***
(0.440) (0.416) (0.397)
Demand -0.053 -0.884**
(0.400) (0.381)
Take -0.830**
(0.352)
enough to counterbalance the cost of the pro-social action.
This explanation makes the empirically testable prediction
that there is a correlation between pro-sociality in frame w
and the difference between the moral judgment associated to
the pro-social action in frame w and the pro-self action in
frame w. In Study 2 we test this hypothesis.
3.1 Experimental design
Participants are presented, in random order, the in-
structions of all the six frames of the extreme Dicta-
tor game in Study 1. After reading the instructions of
the extreme Dictator game, for each frame word w ∈
{Steal,Demand,Take,Give, Boost,Donate}, e.g. w =
Steal, participants are asked the following two questions
in random order:
• From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: to steal?
• From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: not to steal?
Answers are collected using a 5-point Likert scale with: 1
= “extremely wrong”, 2 = “somewhat wrong”, 3 = “neutral”,
4 = “somewhat right”, and 5 = “extremely right”. After
answering all these twelve (two for each frame) questions,
participants enter the demographic questionnaire ending the
survey. Note that, in this study, participants do not make any
decision.4
4We deliberately decided to collect moral judgments using a different
sample to avoid that any correlation be driven by subjects justifying their
choice in terms of morality.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Participants
We recruited 250 US based participants on AMT. None of
them participated in Study 1. After eliminating multiple
IP addresses and multiple TurkIDs, we remained with 221
observations (female = 41.9%, mean age = 34.25).
3.2.2 Predicting pro-sociality from self-reported moral
judgments
We aim at showing that the rate of pro-sociality in Study 1
in frame w can be predicted by the difference between the
moral judgment of the pro-social action in frame w and the
moral judgment of the pro-self action in frame w.
To this end, we define the following sets. Let W+ =
{Don’t steal,Don’t take,Don’t demand,Boost,Give,Donate}
denote the set of wordings corresponding to the pro-
social action. Similarly, let us also define the set W− =
{Steal, Take,Demand,Don’t boost,Don’t give,Don’t donate},
to be the set of wordings corresponding to the pro-self
action. For each w ∈ W+, let ¬w be the corresponding word
inW−, that is, for example, ¬(Don’t steal) = Steal.
For each w ∈ W+, we define the polarization of w to
be Pol(w) = Judgm(w) − Judgm(¬w), where Judgm(w) is
the self-reported moral judgment of w, collected in Study 2
and normalized between -1 and 1, with 0 corresponding to
“neutral”.
Figure 2: Polarization across conditions in Study 2. Error
bars represent standard errors of the means.
Figure 2 reports all the polarizations. When comparing it
to Figure 1, one immediately notices that the pattern of the
polarizations is very similar to the pattern of pro-sociality.
To show that the polarizations indeed explain pro-sociality
in Study 1, we proceed in two steps. First, we note that logit
regression finds an overall significant effect of the variable
Pol(w) on Pro-Sociality (coeff = 2.218, z = 4.867, p < .001).
However, an overall effect does not automatically imply that
the details of the effect arewell explained. Therefore, we next
explore the effect of Pol(w) on Pro-Sociality for every pair
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Table 2: Pairwise logit regression predicting the effect of
Pol(w) on Pro-Sociality, for every pair w1,w2 ∈ W+. We re-
port coefficients and, in brackets, standard errors. Signifi-
cance thresholds: *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01.
Give Donate Demand Take Steal
Boost 5.514 5.858* 4.219** 2.805** 2.681***
(5.362) (3.502) (1.960) (1.203) (0.669)
Give 6.614 3.381 1.902 2.209***
(9.807) (2.805) (1.378) (0.663)
Donate 2.033 1.061 1.848***
(3.665) (1.484) (0.651)
Demand 0.332 1.803**
(2.498) (0.777)
Take 2.516**
(1.068)
w1,w2 ∈ W+. Table 2 reports coefficients and standard errors
of pairwise logit regressions predicting Pro-Sociality as a
function of Pol(w) for every pair w1,w2 ∈ W+. Comparing
Table 2 with Table 1, we observe that all the significance
levels are exactly the same, suggesting that indeed Pol(w)
is a good predictor of Pro-Sociality, even at a point-wise
level. To strengthen this conclusion, we observe that the
coefficients in Table 2 are all similar in magnitude, as shown
by meta-analysis of the coefficients, which finds an overall
effect size of 2.238, statistically significant (z = 7.70, p <
.001), and, crucially, no heterogeneity in the coefficients
(p = 0.977). Note that the coefficient obtained via meta-
analysis (2.238) is very similar to the coefficient obtained via
logit regression (2.218), suggesting that, in our experiment,
the same coefficient for the variable Pol(w) can explain the
rate of pro-sociality in all the frames of Study 1.
4 Discussion
In Study 1 we have shown that the words used to describe
the available actions in an extreme Dictator game can sig-
nificantly alter subjects’ behavior. Study 2 shows that this
framing effect is consistent with a theory of moral prefer-
ences, according to which participants compare the moral
goodness of the pro-social action to the moral badness of
the pro-self action, and then act pro-socially only when their
difference is large enough to counterbalance the cost of the
pro-social action. In this view, the words in Study 1 af-
fect behavioral outcomes by affecting the moral judgments
associated to the available actions.
A number of papers have explored whether the Dictator
Game in the Take frame gives rise to greater pro-sociality
than the same game in the Give frame. Swope et al. (2008)
and Krupka and Weber (2013) have found that, indeed, par-
ticipants tend to be more pro-social in the Take frame than in
the Give frame. Moreover, Krupka and Weber (2013) have
shown that the rate of pro-sociality can be predicted by what
they called “social appropriateness” of an action. However,
the framing effect when passing from the Take frame to the
Give frame has not been replicated by several other works
(Dreber et al., 2013; Grossman & Eckel, 2015; Halvorsen,
2015; Hauge et al., 2016; Goerg et al., 2017). This mixed
results thus left open the question about whether framing ef-
fects actually exist in the Dictator game and whether they can
be actually explained in terms of “social appropriateness” or
similar constructs. Our work sheds light on this topic. We
have indeed found that the words used to describe the avail-
able actions in an extreme Dictator game can alter people’s
behavior, and that, somewhat in line with Krupka andWeber
(2013), that the rate of pro-sociality can be predicted by the
moral judgments associated to the available actions. How-
ever, in line with (Dreber et al., 2013; Grossman & Eckel,
2015; Halvorsen, 2015; Hauge et al., 2016; Goerg et al.,
2017) we have found that the Take frame does not give rise
to a rate of pro-sociality significantly higher than the Give
frame.
The fact that participants care about doing what they think
is the morally right thing has been shown in several contexts
in the last years. For example, empirical evidence has been
presented to support the hypotheses that (i) altruistic be-
havior in the Dictator game and cooperative behavior in the
Prisoner’s dilemma are partly driven by a desire to do the
“right thing” (Capraro & Rand, 2018; Tappin & Capraro,
2018), (ii) differences in behavior in the Dictator game in the
“give” frame vs the “take” frame are driven by a change in
people’s perception about what is the appropriate thing to do
(Krupka & Weber, 2013), (iii) a change in the perception of
what is the morally wrong thing to do can generate framing
effects among Ultimatum game responders (Eriksson et al.,
2017), (iv) moral reminders increase pro-social behavior in
both the Dictator game and the Prisoner’s dilemma (Brañas-
Garza, 2007; Capraro, Jagfeld, Klein, Mul, & van de Pol,
2017; Dal Bó & Dal Bó, 2014). A number of theoretical
models have also been introduced to formalize people’s ten-
dency towards doing the right thing (Alger &Weibull, 2013;
Brekke, Kverndokk, & Nyborg, 2003; DellaVigna, List, &
Malmendier, 2012; Huck, Kübler, & Weibull, 2012; Kessler
& Leider, 2012; Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2016; Krupka
&Weber, 2013; Lazear, Malmendier, &Weber, 2012; Levitt
& List, 2007). Our work adds to this literature by show-
ing that small changes in the language used to describe the
available actions can affect the moral judgments associated
to those actions, which ultimately affect participants’ deci-
sions.
Related to our work is also the game-theoretical litera-
ture on language-based games. In fact, the idea that the
language used to describe the available strategies can affect
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people’s behavior has been supported also by game theo-
rists. Bjorndahl, Halpern & Pass (2013) have argued that
outcome-based preferences do not suffice to explain some
human interactions, which are instead best understood by
defining the utility function on the underlying language used
to describe the game. Motivated by this observation, they
have defined the class of language-based games and have
studied a generalization of Nash equilibrium and rationaliz-
able strategies on these games.
Of course, our results should be interpreted within the nat-
ural limitations of our experiment: an extreme variant of the
Dictator Game with $0.50 at stake. For example, although
previous research has found very little evidence of stake ef-
fects in several games involving pro-socialitywhen stakes are
not too high (Forsythe et al., 1994; Carpenter, Verhoogen, &
Burks, 2005; Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson,
2005; Brañas-Garza et al., 2018; Larney, Rotella, & Barclay,
2019), other studies have found evidence that pro-sociality
decreases at very high stakes (Carpenter et al., 2005; Ander-
sen, Ertaç, Gneezy, Hoffman, & List, 2011). Along these
lines, it might be possible that, when facing very high stakes,
participants’ behavior becomes less influenced by the words
being used to describe the available actions. Understanding
the boundary conditions of the effect of the words used to
describe the available actions on participants’ behavior is a
primary direction for future research. Moreover, our results
are silent about the channel throughwhichwords affectmoral
judgments. One possibility is that the words generate a con-
tinuous endowment effect (Reb & Connolly, 2007) which
ultimately affects participants’ choices. This is certainly a
topic that needs to be thoroughly investigated.
In conclusion, our data show that the words used to de-
scribe the available actions can affect people’s decisions in
extreme dictator games. Future research should explore the
boundary conditions of this effect and the conceptual chan-
nels through which words affect moral judgments.
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Appendix A Experimental Instruc-
tions of Study 1
A.1 Steal vs Don’t steal condition
There are 50 cents available. You have to choose between
two possible actions:
• STEALFROMTHEOTHERPARTICIPANT: Inwhich
case, you get the 50 cents and the other participant gets
0 cents;
• DON’T STEAL FROM THE OTHER PARTICIPANT:
In which case, you get 0 cents and the other participant
gets 50 cents.
The other participant has no choice and will be paid accord-
ing to your decision. No deception is used. You and the
other participant will be paid according to your decision.
Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand
the rules. Remember that you have to answer all of these
questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If
you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and
you will not get any payment.5
• What choices should YOU make in order to maximize
YOUR gain? [Available answers: Steal from the other
participant – Don’t steal from the other participant.]
• What choice shouldYOUmake in order tomaximize the
OTHER PARTICIPANT’s gain? [Available answers:
Steal from the other participant – Don’t steal from the
other participant.]
Congratulations, you passed all comprehension questions. It
is now time to make your choice.
• What is your choice? [Available options: Steal from the
other participant (50 cents for you, 0 cents for the other
participant) / Don’t steal from the other participant (0
cents for you, 50 cents for the other participants)]
A.2 Don’t steal vs Steal condition
Identical to the previous one, with the only difference that
the word “Steal” was replaced by “Don’t Steal”, and the
words “Don’t steal” were replaced by “Steal”. Payoffs were
changed accordingly.6
Appendix B Experimental Instruc-
tions of Study 2
B.1 Moral judgment condition
[The following questions were asked in random order]
Steal screen
Imagine that there are 50 cents available and that you have
to choose between two possible actions:
Steal from the other participant: In which case, you get
the 50 cents and the other participant gets 0 cents
Don’t steal from the other participant: In which case, you
get 0 cents and the other participant gets 50 cents.
Having this situation in mind, please answer the following
questions [presented in random order]:
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: to steal? [Available answers: Extremely wrong /
5A skip logic in the survey eliminated from the survey automatically all
participants providing the wrong answer
6An identical scheme has been adopted for the Take vs Don’t take, Don’t
take vs take, Demand vs Don’t demand, Don’t demand vs Demand, Give vs
Don’t give, Don’t give vs Give, Donate vs Don’t donate, Don’t donate vs
Donate, Boost vs Don’t boost, and Don’t boost vs Boost conditions.
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Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: not to steal? [Available answers: Extremely wrong
/ Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
Take screen
Imagine that there are 50 cents available and that you have
to choose between two possible actions:
Take from the other participant: In which case, you get
the 50 cents and the other participant gets 0 cents
Don’t take from the other participant: In which case, you
get 0 cents and the other participant gets 50 cents.
Having this situation in mind, please answer the following
questions [presented in random order]:
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: to take? [Available answers: Extremely wrong /
Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: not to take? [Available answers: Extremely wrong
/ Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
Demand screen
Imagine that there are 50 cents available and that you have
to choose between two possible actions:
Demand from the other participant: In which case, you
get the 50 cents and the other participant gets 0 cents
Don’t demand from the other participant: In which case,
you get 0 cents and the other participant gets 50 cents.
Having this situation in mind, please answer the following
questions [presented in random order]:
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: to demand? [Available answers: Extremely wrong
/ Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: not to demand? [Available answers: Extremely
wrong / Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Ex-
tremely right]
Give screen
Imagine that there are 50 cents available and that you have
to choose between two possible actions:
Give from the other participant: In which case, you get
the 0 cents and the other participant gets 50 cents
Don’t give from the other participant: In which case, you
get 50 cents and the other participant gets 0 cents.
Having this situation in mind, please answer the following
questions [presented in random order]:
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: to give? [Available answers: Extremely wrong /
Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: not to give? [Available answers: Extremely wrong
/ Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
Donate screen
Imagine that there are 50 cents available and that you have
to choose between two possible actions:
Donate from the other participant: In which case, you get
the 0 cents and the other participant gets 50 cents
Don’t donate from the other participant: In which case,
you get 50 cents and the other participant gets 0 cents.
Having this situation in mind, please answer the following
questions [presented in random order]:
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: to donate? [Available answers: Extremely wrong
/ Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: not to donate? [Available answers: Extremely
wrong / Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Ex-
tremely right]
Boost screen
Imagine that there are 50 cents available and that you have
to choose between two possible actions:
Boost the other participant: In which case, you get the 0
cents and the other participant gets 50 cents
Don’t boost the other participant: In which case, you get
50 cents and the other participant gets 0 cents.
Having this situation in mind, please answer the following
questions [presented in random order]:
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: to boost? [Available answers: Extremely wrong /
Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
From a moral point of view, how would you judge the
choice: not to boost? [Available answers: Extremely wrong
/ Somewhat wrong / Neutral / Somewhat right / Extremely
right]
